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Přátelé svobodného Ruska

Přátelé svobodného Ruska věří myšlence svobodného a demokratického Ruska a propojují české politiky a neziskový sektor, podporují občanskou společnost a chtějí udržovat kontakty s demokraticky a svobodně smýšlejícími Rusy.

Přátelé svobodného Ruska

1 week ago

Aesop’s “The Lion and the Mouse” - The Hungarian Epilogue?Hungary’s recent parliamentary elections may mark more than just a domestic political shift. The opposition movement Tisza (“Freedom and Respect”), led by Péter Magyar, secured a decisive victory, bringing Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule to an end and opening the door to a political reorientation.For years, Orbán positioned himself as one of Moscow’s closest partners within the European Union—blocking or delaying common positions, challenging sanctions, and cultivating a visibly close relationship with Vladimir Putin. The underlying assumption seemed clear: proximity to the “lion” carries political value.Yet when it mattered most - at the ballot box - that relationship appears to have offered little protection. Despite reports of extensive Russian efforts to support Orbán’s position, they were neither sufficient to neutralize domestic dissatisfaction nor to secure another electoral victory.More broadly, this suggests that external backing from Russia, even when substantial, does not necessarily translate into electoral success. On the contrary, it may even become a liability when alignment or dependence become too visible.The fable, in this sense, takes on a different meaning. The mouse may align itself closely with the lion, act in its interest, and rely on its strength. But when confronted with its own immediate political survival, the lion proves unable to intervene in ways that actually matter for the mouse.Not because it does not want to - but because it cannotwww.youtube.com/watch?v=xSfwEv6Cp2swww.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2026-04-13/magyar-ousts-orban-and-pledges-closer-ties-to-europ...vsquare.org/putins-gru-linked-election-fixers-are-already-in-budapest-to-help-orban/ ... See MoreSee Less

As Hungary Ejects Orban, His Successor Pledges a Return to Europe

www.bloomberg.com

Peter Magyar’s sweeping victory is a relief for the EU and a blow to the global right

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Přátelé svobodného Ruska

2 weeks ago

Včera nám bylo velkou ctí a potěšením, že jsme mohli s Přátelé svobodného Ruska podpořit promítání Mr. Nobody Against Putin, které zorganizovaly dvě naše členky Gabriela Svárovská - Zelení a Katerina Demetrashvili.Na setkání dorazila také celá řada našich členů a podporovatelů, včetně Jan Lipavský, Martin Exner, František Kopřiva nebo @Jakub Krainer.Děkujeme za pozvání a budeme se těšit na další akce na půdě našeho parlamentu! Diskuze s Pavlem Talankinem a Radovanem Sibrtem byla vážně zajímavá a obohacující! ... See MoreSee Less

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Přátelé svobodného Ruska

2 weeks ago

Russian Mobilization without effect? The changing logic of the war in UkraineRussian officials continue to reject the need for a new wave of mobilization. Most recently, Dmitry Medvedev stated that there is “no necessity” for additional mobilization. At first glance, this looks like a political signal aimed at maintaining stability. At the same time, it raises a more fundamental question: would mobilization actually change anything?The nature of the war has shifted significantly since 2022. What initially involved more mobile operations has largely turned into a war of attrition-characterized by entrenched positions, drones, and highly lethal firepower. Under these conditions, simply adding more soldiers does not automatically translate into better outcomes.This is reflected in how the battlefield is described. Reports point to very high loss rates, with many soldiers being neutralized before even reaching direct contact with the enemy. While exact figures are difficult to verify, the broader point is clear: the battlefield has become extremely unforgiving.Interestingly, this is not only a Ukrainian assessment. Ukraine’s strategy is often described as one of systematically “bleeding” Russian forces-prioritizing attrition over rapid territorial gains. But similar concerns are increasingly visible within Russia itself.Among pro-war commentators (“voenkory”), there is growing recognition that additional mobilization may have limited impact under current conditions. This is a significant shift from earlier stages of the war, when large-scale mobilization was widely viewed as a key instrument for achieving victory. Some argue that it would mainly increase losses without significantly improving Russia’s position. Others go further and suggest that the focus should shift - from advancing to consolidating and defending already occupied territories.This debate is not happening in isolation. Discussions at a recent policy event in Brussels (organized by the Association for International Affairs and Ondřej Kolář, MEP & Member of Czech Friends of Free Russia), where Ukrainian and European perspectives were presented alongside observations on the development of the Russo-Ukrainian War, point in a similar direction. Despite different starting points, there is a noticeable convergence: the current phase of the war limits what additional manpower can realistically achieve.In that sense, the question of mobilization is no longer just about political will or available resources. It is about whether the underlying logic of the war still allows mobilization to produce meaningful results - or whether it primarily amplifies existing costs.warontherocks.com/2024/09/strangers-in-the-motherland-the-dynamics-of-russias-foreign-recruitment/meduza.io/news/2026/03/27/dmitriy-medvedev-zayavil-chto-v-novoy-volne-mobilizatsii-v-rossii-net-n...www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwXfPG2HnOAwww.youtube.com/watch?v=_5Pt-yw5PBgwww.youtube.com/watch?v=a-5aFmyZ33knovayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/02/28/novaia-voina-na-blizhnem-vostoke-mobilizatsiia-studentov-i-de... ... See MoreSee Less

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Přátelé svobodného Ruska

2 weeks ago

Mass livestock culling in Russia: more than a veterinary issue?Large-scale livestock culling is currently taking place across several regions in Russia. Reports indicate that tens of thousands of animals have been killed, in some cases entire herds - including animals that reportedly showed no visible symptoms. In practice, “culling” here does not mean selective removal, but the systematic destruction of livestock in order to prevent the spread of disease.Official explanations have pointed to diseases such as pasteurellosis and rabies. At the same time, detailed information remains limited, and authorities have provided little transparency beyond general statements. This creates a noticeable mismatch between the scale of the measures and the relatively routine nature of the diseases cited.At the same time, reactions from farmers and within the agricultural sector suggest growing tension around how these measures are being implemented. Reports indicate that culling has in some cases been carried out with limited prior information, while enforcement has involved the presence of Russian police or even special forces (OMON) to ensure compliance - even against the will of owners of livestock. In several regions, farmers have resisted the destruction of their herds, arguing that healthy animals are being killed and that the measures threaten their livelihoods.This discontent has moved beyond the local level. Farmers from multiple regions have traveled to Moscow to demand that the culling be halted, while petitions signed by tens of thousands call for an investigation into the decisions behind the measures. What emerges is not only a veterinary response, but a conflict over authority, information, and economic survival.The overall response pattern-large-scale culling, strict containment measures, and broad restrictions-follows the logic typically associated with highly contagious livestock diseases (e.g. FMD/foot-and-mouth-disease). At the same time, the lack of detailed public information makes it difficult to assess the exact nature of the threat.In this sense, the disease itself appears less as the central issue than as an external shock that triggers a broader dynamic. The combination of limited transparency, centralized decision-making, and coercive implementation shifts the focus from animal health to governance: how decisions are made, how they are enforced, and how affected groups are able - or unable - to respond.www.youtube.com/watch?v=pO3VCAymLHwwww.mdr.de/nachrichten/welt/osteuropa/politik/russland-viehseuche-keulungen-bauernprotest-maul-un...www.dw.com/ru/massovyj-zaboj-skota-v-rossii-cto-proishodit/a-76434844www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c98q8678zpdowww.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/31/farmers-flock-to-moscow-demanding-putin-put-a-stop-to-mass-cull... ... See MoreSee Less

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Přátelé svobodného Ruska

3 weeks ago

Pro War, but Anti-Putin?The National-Bolsheviks in Russia are a good example of how misleading simple categories like “pro-war” vs “anti-war” can be.At first glance, their position seems contradictory: they are broadly supportive of the war, yet openly critical of Putin and the current political system. But this is less a contradiction than a distinction between the “what” and the “how”. They do not fundamentally oppose the war itself, but challenge how it is conducted - and, more importantly, who has the right to define and politically “own” it.In doing so, they implicitly question a core assumption of the current system: that patriotism must be equated with loyalty to the state. Instead, they implicitly advance the idea that one can be patriotic against the government, positioning themselves as more “authentic” representatives of the war effort than the political leadership.This also helps explain their attempt to appeal not only to veterans, but to active combatants. The war is treated as a source of political legitimacy, and those directly involved in it are framed as a distinct constituency with a stronger claim to authority than distant state elites.At the same time, this creates a tension the government is unlikely to tolerate. While the state relies heavily on war-related mobilization and symbolism, it seeks to maintain strict control over how the war is interpreted. Recent moves to restrict platforms like Telegram - long central both for propaganda and frontline coordination - highlight this concern, especially as such measures have triggered rare backlash, including from pro-war bloggers and segments of the regime’s own support base.This backlash is primarily framed in functional terms: restrictions are criticized for undermining military coordination and effectiveness at the front. At the same time, the war itself creates a space of political opportunity, in which actors within a broader network of illiberal civil society - such as “voenkory”- can further distinguish themselves from the state, presenting themselves as more authentic and committed representatives of the war effort.This logic extends beyond fringe actors. A striking example is the recent case of Ilya Remeslo, a long-time pro-Kremlin figure who abruptly turned against Putin, calling for his resignation and prosecution: “Vladimir Putin must resign and be put on trial as a war criminal and a thief”. It illustrates how even actors embedded in the pro-war milieu are not necessarily loyal to the state, but may instead reposition themselves within the same ideological space when opportunities or constraints change.In that sense, the National-Bolsheviks are not an anomaly, but part of a wider dynamic: even within the pro-war camp, the question of who speaks for the war - and what it means - remains contested.meduza.io/feature/2026/03/18/bloger-i-donoschik-ilya-remeslo-on-stoyal-za-ugolovnym-delom-navalno...meduza.io/en/feature/2026/03/20/days-ago-a-longtime-pro-putin-blogger-published-a-tirade-against-...www.dw.com/ru/blokirovka-telegram-paralizuet-armiu-rf-na-fronte-v-ukraine/a-75960691www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-03-17/russia-accelerates-internet-shutdownswww.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/OSW%20REPORT%20The%20Great%20Russian%20Firewall-www.pdfnovayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/02/27/partiia-mertvykh ... See MoreSee Less

Партия мертвых. Как нацболы поддерживают войну и выступают против Путина — Новая газета Европа

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